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Abstract 
 The Dutch social protection system has been under reconstruction from the early 1980s. After 
describing the structure of the current system and addressing recent developments as to the treatment 
of families and individuals, the paper presents three scenarios that could develop in future years. The 
first is that of full individualization, in which benefits and conditions are attuned to individual 
citizens without considering their care for others and the financial means of others in their 
household. The second scenario is that of a "mini-system", in which statutory benefits are restricted 
to some minimum level. The third scenario is that of further differentiation of the social minimum by 
household size, in which benefits are better attuned to the composition and size of household types. 
These three scenarios are evaluated on the basis of four criteria. The differentiation scenario 
appears to meet nearly all criteria and seems to offer a new solution for the problem of the weak 
income position of households with children relative to other household types on the minimum 
income level. (JEL code: H55) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 From the early 1980s, the Dutch system of social protection
1
 has been in a more or less permanent 
state of reconstruction induced by social, economic, and cultural developments. Changes in household 
types and course of life, labor market participation and labor patterns, emancipation of women, and 
opinions on public and private responsibilities have required reforms in the substance and form of the 
social protection system. Increased regulation has complicated the system and has made it more 
difficult to administer the system. The growing number of beneficiaries (unemployed, elderly, and 
disabled) and cost increases (health care) have led to mounting social protection expenditures. 
Addressing these problems is controversial, because reforming the system may have significant 
consequences for different household types. 
 This paper does not provide a blueprint for a large reform of the social security system in the 
Netherlands. Rather, it is confined to developing three scenarios that could arise. The aim is to clarify 
the consequences of the different scenarios. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly 
explains the structure of the Dutch social protection system. It also addresses recent developments as to 
the treatment of families and individuals. Section 3 lists three different scenarios that could develop in 
future years. They are based on an analysis of policies that have been pursued, proposals that have 
been put forward, and trends that can be observed. In addition, this section presents four criteria that 
will be applied in judging the different scenarios. Sections 4-6 deal with three scenarios that are 
possible in the near future. The first scenario is that of full individualization, in which benefits and 
conditions are attuned to individual citizens without taking into account their care for others and the 
financial means of others in their household. The second scenario is that of a mini-system, in which 
statutory benefits are restricted to some minimum level. Although additional insurance is possible in 
this scenario, government does not provide for it and leaves it to the market. The third scenario is that 
of differentiation of the social minimum income by household size, in which benefits are better attuned 
to the composition and size of household types. This scenario envisages introducing parenthood for 
determining benefit levels, a status not currently considered in the Dutch system. Finally, section 7 
presents an evaluation of the three scenarios based on the criteria as described in section 3. 
                                         
*
 Erasmus University in Rotterdam-Netherlands and University of Economics in Bucharest-Romania. The 
author would like to thank David Rasmussen for his valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
1. Social protection is a wider concept than social security. Social security pertains to social insurance, which 
is compulsory and not means-tested. Social protection includes social security and welfare. Welfare is means-
tested; only those whose financial resources fall below a certain level qualify for welfare. 
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2. The Dutch system of social protection 
 
 In the past, the Dutch social protection system mirrored the fact that most men were breadwinners 
and most women housewives. Income supplements to low-income breadwinners were designed to 
support dependent spouses, but not children. From the early 1970s, however, this situation has 
profoundly changed. Female labor market participation rates in the Netherlands have rapidly risen, 
particularly in the 1980s, and currently they exceed the European Union average.
2
 Two-earner families 
now form the largest single category of households.
3
 The social protection system has changed 
accordingly by abolishing most of the breadwinner's provisions. As a result, social security 
compensation has largely been individualized. 
 Traditionally, the Dutch social protection system is divided into the following arrangements: 
1. Social insurance 
 a) Employees' social insurance 
 b) General social insurance 
2. Social provisions 
 Social insurance is financed by payroll taxes (or social security contributions), whereas social 
provisions are financed by general taxes. Employees' social insurance is based on the continental (or 
Bismarck) system. It covers employees rather than the entire population and it is based on the insurance 
(or quid quo pro) principle. There is a relationship between the contribution into employees' social 
insurance and the benefit received, since the social security compensation depends on the formerly 
earned wage.
4
 Employees' social insurance, therefore, bring about primarily horizontal income 
redistribution. This refers to redistribution between social groups, for example between employed and 
unemployed individuals, healthy and sick persons, etc. as opposed to redistribution between income 
brackets. General social insurance is based on the Beveridge (or Anglo Saxon) system. It is universal 
and covers, in principle, the whole population. Moreover, it is based on the solidarity principle, which 
implies that higher income brackets pay higher contributions into the system than lower income 
brackets even though their benefits do not differ. Contributions into general social insurance are a 
percentage of the income and, thus, income-dependent. However, beneficiaries receive, in principle, 
equal benefits at the social minimum level. General social insurance, therefore, emphasizes vertical 
income redistribution, i.e., redistribution between different income brackets. 
 Social provisions are also based on the Beveridge system. Like general social insurance, they are 
universal and cover the entire population. In addition, they are based on the solidarity principle because 
the offer benefits on the social minimum level that are, in principle, equal to all recipients, whereas 
progressive taxation implies that contributions into the system increase by income. Thus, social 
provisions also stress vertical income redistribution. 
 As of January 1, 1998 the general disability scheme
5
 was abolished and replaced with two new 
arrangements: one for self-employed and one for youths (see also note 7). The mandatory disability 
insurance for self-employed individuals is a new and hybrid category in the Dutch social security 
system, since it bears characteristics of both employees' and general social insurance. A characteristic 
that it has in common with employees' social insurance is that it does not cover the entire population, 
                                         
2. In 1979, the female labor force participation rate in the Netherlands amounted to 33.4 per cent (OECD 
1988, p. 200). This figure has nearly doubled to 61.3 per cent in 1997, which compares to a female 
participation rate of 57.7 per cent in the European Union and 54.7 per cent in OECD Europe (OECD, 1998, p. 
193). Yet, it is still fashionable to assert that the female labor participation rate is relatively low in the 
Netherlands (see for example Arents and Olieman, 1998, p. 75). 
3. In 1977, single-earner households numbered 51.3 per cent and two-earner households 27.3 per cent of all 
households. In 1995, however, these figures amounted to 19.7 and 44.3 per cent, respectively (Bos, 1998, p. 
18). 
4. Though compensation is limited to a certain cap, this does not infringe upon the quid pro quo principle, 
since contributions into the system are tied to the same cap. 
5. In addition to the general disability scheme there is an employees' disability insurance, which still exists. 
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but only a certain well-described group. With general social insurance it has in common that 
beneficiaries receive equal benefits at the minimum level, though contributions into the system are 
income-related. 
 Employees' social insurance and the newly introduced disability insurance for self-employed 
persons are individualized by their very nature (quid pro quo). Employees are protected against the loss 
of wages caused by unemployment, sickness, and disability. Since wages are payments to individuals, a 
compensation replacing a wage is also an individualized payment. Disability compensation for self-
employed individuals, though less self-evident, is also individualized. General social insurance is based 
on the solidarity principle, which is consistent with family-based benefits allowing for partners' incomes 
rather than benefits attuned to formerly earned incomes of individuals. Nonetheless, general social 
insurance has largely been individualized in the 1970s and 1980s, thereby undermining the solidarity 
principle. Social provisions, however, which are also based on the solidarity principle, have so far 
hardly been affected by the trend towards individualization.
6
 Notably, the individualization process has 
been limited to adults. Children are considered dependent and are not autonomously entitled to any 
social benefit. 
 Another trend arising in the 1970s and 1980s was the increasing number of couples forming a 
household without officially being married. The social protection system has responded to this 
phenomenon by treating couples living together equally, regardless whether they are married and 
whether they are of different sexes. As a result, unmarried couples and same sex couples living together 
as if they were married are treated equally with married couples.
7
 
 The current system guarantees social protection by meeting minimum needs, though the 
implementation differs across various insurance and social provisions. In the Netherlands, employees' 
social insurance meets individual needs. General social insurance used to meet household needs, but as 
a result of the individualization process it now mainly meets individual needs. Social assistance still 
meets, in principle, household needs. The point of departure with respect to social assistance benefit 
levels is the net statutory minimum wage. Minimum social benefits, the so-called social minima, are 
derived from the legal minimum wage. The social minimum for couples equals the net minimum wage. 
For lone-parent families the social minimum amounts to 70 per cent of the minimum wage plus a 
supplement of not more than 20 per cent of the minimum wage if they cannot share living costs with 
other adults. The social minimum for single persons amounts to 50 per cent of the statutory minimum 
wage plus a supplement of 20 per cent of the minimum wage if they cannot share living costs. Whether 
or not beneficiaries qualify for a supplement is judged by the local authorities administering the social 
assistance scheme. In addition, the local authorities have some discretion to grant supplements (of up to 
20 per cent of the social minimum) to other single parents and single persons, although these 
supplements are subject to guidelines. 
 These norms have been established in the past on the basis of budget research (Social Economic 
Council, 1964),
8
 but it is questionable if norms once chosen in a distant past still hold. Consumption 
patterns change over time, for example, because new products enter the market and because relative 
prices change. This may affect the income ratios deemed necessary and equitable for different 
household types.
9
 In principle, there are only three norms derived from the legal minimum wage, as 
mentioned before. For couples the social minimum amounts to 100 per cent of the statutory minimum 
wage. For single parent households it is 90 per cent of the statutory minimum wage if the maximum 
supplement is included. And for single persons the social minimum amounts to 70 per cent of the legal 
                                         
6. An exception is a new arrangement for disabled youth introduced on January 1, 1998. It offers disability 
compensation for those who became disabled when they were younger than 18 years old and it is financed from 
general taxes. This is the only social provision with individualized benefits. 
7. This seems to infringe upon vertical equity in that people in unequal positions are treated equally. Unlike an 
unmarried couple, a married couple is subject to legal obligations as to alimony if their marriage breaks up. 
8. The foundation of this methodology has been laid by Houthakker and Prais (1955). 
9. Unlike 40 years ago, certain goods - for example a washing machine, a television set, a telephone, etc. - may 
now be considered necessary goods for people with a social minimum income. 
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minimum wage if the maximum supplement is included. 
 This set of norms (all on a net basis) implies that the system hardly considers the presence of 
children in households. Regardless of their income, all households with children receive the same 
allowance for each child, that covers roughly 30-45 per cent of the costs - on the social minimum level - 
of raising the child (Netherlands Family Council, 1997, p. 119).
10
 The underlying idea is that parents 
are largely responsible for the needs of their children. Only in the case of lone-parent families does the 
presence of one or more children count, since for these households the social minimum amounts to 90 
per cent of the legal minimum wage (as opposed to 70 per cent for single persons). However, the 
number of children does not figure as to the social minimum. Only the child allowance is paid per child, 
but that holds for all households with children including those with incomes exceeding the social 
minimum. Since couples with children living on welfare have to spend part of their income supporting 
their children, they are worse off relative to childless couples and singles, who can spend their entire 
income on themselves. Couples with children living on welfare are also worse off, though to a lesser 
extent, relative to lone-parent households on the social minimum level. In the current system, therefore, 
the income position of households with children living on welfare is inferior relative to other households 
living on welfare. A comparison of social assistance (excluding net housing cost) in seven other 
European countries shows that the Netherlands in this respect considerably differs from other European 
countries. Table 1 displays that the income ratios of households with children living on welfare are 
exceptionally low compared to those in other European countries. 
  
TABLE 1 
Social Assistance Excluding Net Housing Cost in Eight European Countries, 1994 
(Ratios Based on a Childless Couple's Income) 
Country Single person Childless couple Couple with 2 children One parent family 
Belgium  72  100  138  146 
Denmark  46  100  153  130 
Finland  56  100  178  136 
France  71  100  135  130 
Germany  55  100  166  143 
Netherlands  62  100  119  107 
Sweden  60  100  164  124 
UK  62  100  178  144 
Note: Calculations based on Hansen et al. (1995) and Einerhand (1997). 
 
 
                                         
10.  Higher income families spend more on raising their children than minimum income families. If 
expenditures on children are considered costs of raising them, the child allowance covers a lower share of the 
costs of raising a child by higher income families relative to minimum income families. 
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3. A scenario approach
11
 
 
 This paper develops three scenarios for a new social protection system linking up with proposals 
that have already been put forward: 
1. Full individualization. In this scenario, benefits and conditions are attuned to individual citizens 
without taking into account their care for others and the financial means of others in their household. 
2. A mini-system. In this scenario statutory benefits are restricted to some minimum level. In the 
current system, employees' social insurance provides wage-related benefits. As a result, these benefits 
may exceed the social minimum level. This would not occur in a mini-system, since it limits benefits to 
the minimum level. Those who consider this insufficient coverage can decide to purchase additional 
insurance in the market place, but it is also conceivable that employers' organizations and trade unions 
would negotiate additional private insurance to be included in collective wage agreements. 
3. Differentiation on the minimum level. In this scenario benefits are better attuned to the 
composition and size of household types. Effectively, it introduces a new criterion (parenthood) in the 
social protection system for determining benefit levels. 
 The scenarios deal with relative income positions of different household types in the social 
protection system. The concept of household type pertains to families, childless couples, and single 
persons. The concept of families pertains to household types consisting of one or two adults living 
together with one or more children. Thus, the concept of family as applied in this paper comprises both 
lone-parent and two-parent families and does not differentiate between married and unmarried couples, 
nor does it differentiate between mixed sex and same sex couples. The scenarios focus on the position 
of families, but they also pay attention to the position of single persons and childless couples. In 
addition, the discussion is confined to the structure of cash benefits on the minimum income level. 
Consequently, the funding and organization of the social protection system are ignored. 
 In judging the consequences of the different scenarios the following (normative) criteria are 
applied: 
1. The extent to which social protection is guaranteed for all household types. 
2. The extent to which the presence of children in household types is taken into account. 
3. The extent to which related levels of social benefits for different household types are reasonable. 
4. The extent of equal opportunities and equal rights and obligations for men and women with respect 
to benefits and labor participation. 
 The first criterion pertains to the benefit level. Guaranteeing some social minimum income is an 
important function of the social protection system, although determining the absolute level of the social 
minimum is normative in nature. The second criterion is related to the fact that most social benefits are 
attuned to rights and needs of adults. Generally, they do not take into account the possible care for 
children. Admittedly, child benefits supplement family incomes, but in the Netherlands only to a limited 
extent since they are intended to cover a small part of the cost of raising children. The third criterion 
pertains to the relative positions of different household types. Some benefits are more favorable for 
certain household types and less favorable for other household types. For other benefits the reverse may 
be true. Households with children often prove to have an inferior income position relative to single 
persons and childless couples, in particular on the minimum income level. The fourth criterion is related 
to the positions of men and women. They should have equal opportunities to attain financial 
independence. Furthermore, the system should facilitate a balanced division of tasks over men and 
women within their household types resulting in equal rights and obligations. 
 
 
                                         
11. Other approaches are conceivable, such as microsimulation and general equilibrium models (see for 
example Gelauff and Graafland, 1994). These approaches have not been applied, however, since this paper 
focuses on systemic features and consequences of the three scenarios considered. 
  6 
 
 
 
4. The scenario of full individualization 
 
 In this paper, individualization of social protection is defined as allocating rights and laying 
obligations on individual adults regardless of their living situation and household type. This implies that 
no regard is paid to economies of scale of a common household nor to the presence of a partner with or 
without financial means. A provocative question is whether children should be allocated autonomous 
entitlements. In this paper it is assumed that the answer is negative, since children cannot take care of 
themselves, and even if they could they cannot legally represent themselves. Therefore, even if children 
were allocated autonomous entitlements, one or more adults (parents or guardians) would have to serve 
as an intermediary between the children and the body that grants the entitlement. 
 Further individualization of the Dutch social protection system than so far has been realized, can 
be achieved in two ways. First, provisions that have already been individualized can be expanded by 
extending the duration of the benefit and/or by easing the eligibility requirements. Second, non-
individualized entitlements can be individualized. Possible variants are: 
-Lengthening the duration of unemployment compensation until the retirement age. 
-Gradual introduction of individualization by birth cohorts setting entitlements at a minimum level 
regardless of the partner's income. 
-Abolishing the supplements for partners in certain social protection provisions.
12
 
-Abolishing the means test for partners. 
 Individualization implies certain changes in the social protection system which may make further 
changes necessary. Employees' social insurance is already individualized and, thus, does not need any 
adjustment. As to general social insurance, however, the supplement in the old age pension for partners 
younger than 65 and without or with little financial means would be abolished. Also, the increased 
benefits for single retired persons with dependent children would be abolished. In addition, a survivor's 
pension would not fit an individualized system, since this benefit is associated with the termination of a 
household type. Thus, survivors' pensions would be abolished as a result of individualization. Child 
allowance is meant for households with children (lone-parent and two-parents families). Whether or not 
the child allowance would remain in existence in an individualized system depends on the allocation of 
"own" entitlements to children. 
 Most profound adjustments are needed in this scenario with regard to social provisions. It should 
be reiterated that social provisions differ from social security arrangements in that the former are 
financed from general taxes, whereas the latter are funded by social security contributions. Currently, 
social provisions are means tested against the means of both the beneficiary and the partner. In an 
individualized system the partner's income would be left out of consideration. Also, social assistance 
would be independent of the partner's income and wealth. The common wealth of couples should, thus, 
be imputed in one way or another to both partners individually, which would make social assistance 
more susceptible to fraud. Generally, all supplements for partners would be abolished, for in an 
individualized system supplements can only make up to an individual social minimum income. 
 Consistent individualization would thus alter the social protection system profoundly. If two 
individuals living together are entitled to some benefit, the income ratios for single persons, lone-parent 
families, and couples would become 70:70:140 (percentages of the legal minimum wage). In the current 
system these ratios are 70:90:100, since the social minimum (including the maximum supplement) 
amounts to 70 per cent of the statutory minimum wage for single persons, 90 per cent for lone-parent 
families, and 100 per cent for couples. Couples would benefit from full individualization. Together they 
would get 140 rather than 100 per cent of the statutory minimum wage, since both partners are entitled 
to an individualized benefit. Lone-parent families, however, would be worse off. They would get 70 per 
cent rather than 90 per cent in the current system, since they, too, are entitled to an individualized 
benefit. As to single persons there would be no change, but their position relative to that of couples 
                                         
12. It is possible that someone receives a social benefit that is sufficient if the recipient would be single, but 
falls short of the relevant social minimum if the recipient has a dependent spouse. Therefore, supplements may 
be granted to lift the recipient's income to the relevant social minimum, i.e., the social minimum applicable to 
the recipient's household. 
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would deteriorate (the ratio of 70:100 would change into 70:140). The loss of income for lone-parent 
families would imply a deterioration of social protection guarantee as to this category. The paradox of 
full individualization is, therefore, that it does not affect single persons, but it would make couples 
better off and lone-parent families worse off. 
 Individualization seems (indirectly) to further the financial independence of women with a partner. 
If they do not have a paid job, they are entitled to an individual benefit that is not tested against their 
partner's financial means. As a result, individualization leads to a considerable increase of social 
protection expenditure,
13
 which must be financed somehow. First, tax rates could be raised. However, 
this seems politically infeasible, since in Dutch politics there is a consensus that the tax burden should 
be decreased rather than increased. Second, the number of beneficiaries could be decreased by 
tightening eligibility rules. It is hard to understand, however, why raising social benefits for couples 
should lead to the exclusion of certain categories that are currently eligible to some social benefit. 
Third, public expenditures could be cut. As a result of the Dutch "stringent budget policy", which 
demands that spending overruns be compensated in the same spending category, cuts would have to be 
made in social spending rather than other public spending categories (such as national defense, 
education, etc.). Thus, increased social spending resulting from full individualization would most likely 
be compensated for by a reduction of benefit levels across the board. In this case, the consequences of 
full individualization would be a limited income rise for couples and income declines for single persons 
and lone-parent families, while the latter category would lose mostly (Van der Hoek, 1987, p. 31). This 
adds to the paradox of full individualization that couples are made better off and single-parent families 
are made worse off, while single persons are not affected. 
 
 
5. The scenario of a mini-system 
 
 The term mini-system refers to a case in which social benefits are organized and financed via the 
public sector, but are limited to a certain minimum level. Thus, government only retains a clear 
responsibility with regard to benefits that do not exceed the social minimum. This can be realized in 
different ways: 
1. A statutory mini-system. The legislature guarantees benefits on the minimum level fully 
administered by the public sector. 
2. A system fully controlled by legislation. The legislature guarantees conditions that have to be met 
by minimum benefit arrangements established by the private sector. 
3. A system partly controlled by legislation. The legislature allows arrangements established by the 
social partners (by sector or possibly by enterprise), if they meet certain statutory conditions. Those 
sectors that do not establish collective arrangements are subject to a statutory mini-system. 
 Central to a mini-system is compensation of the loss of income up to a certain level. To be eligible 
to a minimum compensation one would have to be willing to accept paid work. Like in the current 
system, general social insurance and social assistance would be means tested, while the benefit level 
would vary by household type. 
 General social insurance and social assistance provide benefits on the minimum level. Therefore, 
they fit, in principle, a mini-system. Though child benefits do not compensate income losses, they may 
be included, in principle, in a mini-system. Thus, the implementation of a mini-system would only 
affect the employees' social insurance. Compensation on account of this insurance would be limited to 
                                         
13. By individualization nearly two million dependent partners in the Netherlands will qualify for individual 
social assistance overnight, while the total population amounts to almost 16 million. The consequences on the 
macro level heavily depend on future possibilities for labor market participation, possible changes in work 
effort, the level of the individualized benefits, and eligibility requirements. On the basis of the current norm for 
single persons - 70 per cent of the statutory minimum wage if the maximum supplement is included - net 
social expenditure would increase by an estimated 11 per cent if it is assumed that work effort does not change 
as a result of the program. In addition, it is estimated that net social expenditure would increase by 15 per cent 
if work effort does change (Netherlands Family Council, 1993, pp. 50-53). 
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the social minimum, for example 70 per cent of the minimum wage. Compensation on account of 
unemployment, disability, and sickness, which is currently related to the most recently earned wage, 
would no longer be guaranteed by government insofar it exceeds the social minimum level. 
 The private sector may offer complementary insurance, but private insurance of social risks is not 
always possible because of problems such as risk clustering, adverse selection, and moral hazard. 
Therefore, private insurers set a number of requirements. For example, they demand the possibility of 
judging risks in order to set an adequate premium per individual. Thus, the market does not always 
offer a solution for individuals with relatively high risks. Insurers consider unemployment a risk that 
cannot be privately insured because of unpredictable movements of the business cycle and because the 
unemployment risk of individuals are to a certain extent correlated. During cyclical downturns, many 
firms have to dismiss workers, which results in a considerable increase in claims. If government 
considers the possibility to purchase a complementary unemployment insurance (covering 
compensation beyond the minimum level) desirable, it has to be provided by government. 
 Income ratios on the minimum level would remain unchanged, in principle. The use of the three 
Dutch norms implies, again, that only in the case of lone-parent families the presence of children is 
taken into account. Thus, a mini-system would not consider the presence of children any more than the 
current system. With regard to equal treatment of men and women the mini-system seemingly would not 
differ from the current system. In a mini-system, the guarantee of social protection by government 
would be limited to the social minimum level. The consequences of this limitation would be relatively 
small, since the vast majority of social benefits in the current system already are minimum benefits. In 
1990, an estimated 86 per cent of all social benefits were minimum benefits (Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Employment, 1990, p. 59), while in 1994 this estimate amounted to 87 per cent (Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Employment, 1989, p. 20). 
 
 
6. The scenario of differentiation of the social minimum by household size 
 
 A system of social benefits varying by size and composition of the household offers the possibility 
to attune the social minimum better to the needs of households. Currently, employees' social insurance 
aim at meeting the individual needs of beneficiaries. Though old age and survivors' pensions and social 
assistance differ across household types, the norms used (70:90:100 for, respectively, single persons, 
lone-parent families and couples with or without children) imply that both the presence and the number 
of children are hardly taken into account. Though Table 2 shows that in the current system the social 
minimum increases by household size because of the child allowance, the increases are relatively small. 
A social minimum that differentiates more by size and composition of households would attune it better 
to household needs, while the cost of children on the minimum income level could fully be compensated. 
Effectively, this scenario would introduce a new criterion (parenthood) as one of the factors 
determining the benefit level. 
 The idea of differentiating the social minimum according to household size has been put forward in 
the past by a minority of the Social Economic Council (1986, p. 65), suggesting the norms as presented 
in Table 2.
14
 For the sake of comparison Table 2 also includes the norms as they were effective from 
April 1, 1998. In addition, Table 2 displays the norms consistent with a differentiation scenario and 
based on a social minimum that fully compensates for the cost of raising children on the minimum level. 
For example, the difference between a single person and a single parent with one child amounts to 33 
per cent of the legal minimum wage. Adding more children leads to much smaller increases, reflecting 
economies of scale. The differentiation scenario would lead to different income ratios, but its adoption 
would not imply an absolute income loss for any household type. 
 
 
                                         
14. The Social Economic Council took a couple with two children as point of departure (100%). Since in this 
paper a childless couple serves as starting point (100%), the norms suggested by the Council have been 
converted to this basis. 
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TABLE 2 
Minimum Norms as to Household Types (Ratios Based on a Childless Couple's Income) 
Household type  Social Economic 
 Council 
Current system
a
 Differentiation 
 scenario
b
 
 
2 Adults 
 
 100 
 
 100 
 
 100 
 
2 Parents and 1 Child  
 
 111 
 
 106 
 
 119 
 
2 Parents and 2 Children 
 
 118 
 
 112 
 
 129 
 
2 Parents and 3 Children 
 
 124 
 
 119 
 
 141 
    
1 Parent and 1 Child  93  96  109 
 
1 Parent and 2 Children 
 
 100 
 
 102 
 
 119 
 
1 Parent and 3 Children 
 
 106 
 
 109 
 
 130 
    
Single person without an 
independent household 
 
 59 
 
 50 
 
 50 
 
Single person with an 
independent household 
 
 
 82 
 
 
 70 
 
 
 70 
 
a. Social minimum (including holiday allowance and child allowance) as a percentage of the social 
minimum (NLG 1,944.82) including holiday allowance (NLG 104.52) for a childless couple as of 
April 1, 1998. 
b. Social minimum (including holiday allowance and child allowance) fully covering the cost of 
children on the minimum level as a percentage of the social minimum (NLG 1,944.82) including 
holiday allowance (NLG 104.52) for a childless couple. 
 
 
TABLE 3 
Social Minimum Excluding Child Allowance in the Differentiation Scenario 
Household Type  Social Minimum 
2 Adults  100 
2 Adults and 1 Child  113 
2 Adults and 2 Children  117 
2 Adults and 3 Children  121 
1 Parent and 1 Child  103 
1 Parent and 2 Children  107 
1 Parent and 3 Children  111 
Single person without an independent household  50 
Single person with an independent household  70 
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 This scenario generates income ratios that consider the "children" factor more than the current 
system. This would be done by varying the social minimum according to composition and size of the 
household. For the sake of simplicity and practicability it would not consider the children's age, while 
for the same reasons the differentiation by size would remain limited to a maximum of three children. 
This would imply an expansion of the number of norms for household types to nine (from three in the 
current system) as is done in Table 3.
15
 On top of these norms would come the child allowance resulting 
in the income ratios as displayed by the last column in Table 2. 
 
 In principle, differentiation of the social minimum by household size would not imply any change 
with regard to the employees' social insurance, since these are individualized and unrelated to household 
type. General social insurance do differentiate according to household type, however. Thus, they would 
be affected by a larger variation of the minimum income norms used. The newly introduced disability 
schemes for youth and self-employed, however, would be exceptions, since they offer benefits not 
related to household type. Child allowances could continue to exist in their current form. Social 
assistance arrangements would show more variation according to composition and size of household 
type. In particular the number of children would play an important role in determining the relevant 
social minimum. 
 
 
7. Evaluation 
 
 The current social protection system uses in those arrangements related to household type only 
three norms, which considers the presence and the number of children only to a very limited extent (see 
Table 2). A system with norms that vary by household size meets this criticism. Not surprisingly, 
income ratios change considerably in a system with norms that differentiate according to composition 
and size of households, as displayed by Table 2. Though absolute monthly payments to single persons 
and childless couples would not change relative to the current system, they would decline relative to 
payments to households with children. The latter payments would increase considerably, both 
absolutely and relative to payments to other household types. As a result, spending on social protection 
would increase by an estimated NLG 900 million or 0.5 per cent.
16
 Thus, a relatively small increase in 
social spending would lead to a relatively big increase in equity. 
 A problem that may arise in the differentiation scenario is that employees (and self-employed 
persons) with children and an income below or around the social minimum have a lower net monthly 
income than families on welfare. This could be interpreted as a perverse incentive, since it would pay to 
quit work and apply for welfare, although the rules do not permit such a behavioral response. Even if 
the rules would be observed, however, it presents a bottleneck, since those concerned would have to call 
on social assistance to make up their income. In the Netherlands, it is considered undesirable if 
individuals working full time would need social assistance. But if they would, it seems politically 
unacceptable if they would be subjected to the means test. A possible solution to this problem may be 
the introduction of a publicly provided wage supplement, which is formally no social assistance and, 
thus, could protect minimum wage workers from being subjected to the means test. 
 A system of social benefits that vary by size and composition of the household would explicitly 
consider the presence and number of children. As a result, in determining the social minimum the needs 
of households would be met better. The differentiation scenario would perform better than the current 
system with regard to reasonable ratios of social benefits for different household types and social 
protection for all household types and it would bring the divergent position of the Netherlands more in 
line with benefit ratios in other European countries. However, differentiation would not contribute more 
to the furthering of equal opportunities and equal rights and obligations for men and women as to 
benefits and labor participation. In this respect, individualization and a mini-system may imply an 
                                         
15. The underlying calculations can be obtained from the author. 
16. The underlying calculations can be obtained from the author. 
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improvement relative to the current system. Thus, it seems that there is a trade-off between a more 
equitable income distribution over households on the one hand and equal rights and obligations of 
individuals on the other hand. 
 Figure 1 shows these trade-offs schematically. Differentiation of the social minimum by size and 
composition of households meets nearly all criteria, which is in contrast with individualization and a 
mini-system. The differentiation scenario, therefore, seems to offer a solution for the problem of the 
observed weak income position of households with children relative to other household types on the 
minimum income level. 
 
FIGURE 1 
The Scenarios Compared with the Current System on the Basis of Four Criteria
a
 
 Individualization Mini-system Differentiation 
Guarantee of social protection 
for all household types 
 -  -  + 
The extent to which the presence 
of children in household types is 
taken into account 
 -  -  ++ 
A reasonable ratio of social 
protection payments to household 
types 
 -  0  + 
Equal opportunities and equal 
rights and obligations for men 
and women as to social benefits 
and labor force participation 
 +  +/0  0 
a.   -: negative effect; 0: no effect; +: positive effect; ++: strong positive effect 
 
 
 
References 
 
Arents, M.; Olieman, R. Werkt bijstand in Europa?, The Hague, Netherlands: VUGA, 1998. 
Bos, W. (1998) "Inkomen van een- en tweeverdieners, 1996," Sociaal-Economische Maandstatistiek, 
15, 4, pp. 18-21. 
Einerhand, M. (1997) "Bijstand: een internationale vergelijking," Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 52, 4, pp. 
207-220. 
Gelauff, G.M.M.; Graafland, J.J. Modelling Welfare State Reform, Amsterdam, Netherlands: North-
Holland, 1994. 
Hansen, H.; Heinsen, H.; Salomäki, A.; Viitamäki, H.; Amira, S.; Knoblich, B.; Semrau, P.; Capellen, 
A.; Ball, J.; Einerhand, M.; Metz, H.; Van Galen, J.; Eriksson, I.; Lindholm, L-E. Unemployment 
Benefits and Social Assistance in seven European countries, The Hague, Netherlands: Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Employment, 1995. 
Houthakker, H.S.; Prais, S.J. The analysis of family budgets with an application to two British surveys 
conducted in 1937-9 and their detailed results, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955. 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. Financiële nota sociale zekerheid 1990, Tweede Kamer 
(Parliamentary Papers), vergaderjaar 1989-1990, 21312, Nos. 1-2, 1989. 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. Nota sociale zekerheid 1991, Tweede Kamer 
(Parliamentary Papers), vergaderjaar 1990-1991, 21807, Nos. 1-2, 1990. 
Netherlands Family Council. Denken over individualisering, The Hague, Netherlands: NGR, 1993. 
Netherlands Family Council. Gezinnen en sociale zekerheid; beleidsalternatieven, The Hague, 
Netherlands: NGR, 1997. 
  12 
 
 
 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. OECD Employment Outlook, Paris, France: 
OECD, 1988. 
____. Employment Outlook, Paris, France: OECD, 1998. 
Schiepers, J.M.P.; Van Gessel-Dabekaussen, A.A.M.W.; Elkink, A.J. Equivalentiefactoren volgens de 
budgetverdelingsmethode, The Hague, Netherlands: VUGA, 1993. 
Social Economic Council. Advies over de hoogte van de kinderbijslagen, The Hague, Netherlands: 
SER, 1964. 
Social Economic Council. Advies sociale uitkeringen op minimumniveau, The Hague, Netherlands: 
SER, 1986. 
Van der Hoek, M.P. De praktijk van de inkomensverdeling, Groningen, Netherlands: Wolters-
Noordhoff, 1987. 
